INTRODUCTION
The Sphinx once challenged a particularly tasty-looking student of language to solve the riddle: "How is saying 'My toe is turning blue,' as a request to get off my toe, similar to slamming a door in someone's face?" The poor student stammered that in both cases, when the agents are trying to communicate sometiling, they have analogous intentions. ' 'Yes indeed " countered the Sphinx, ' 'but what are those intentions?" Hearing no reply, the monster promptly devoured the poor student and sat back smugly to wait for the next oral exam.
Contemporary philosophers have been girding up for the next trek to Giza. According to Grice (1957) ' , the slamming of a door communicates the slammer's anger only when the intended observer of that act realizes that the slammer wanted both to slam the door in his face and for the observer to believe that to be his intention. That is, the slammer intended the observer to recognize his intentions. Slamming caused by an accidental shove or by nabral means is not a communicative act. Similarly, saying "My toe is turning blue" only communicates that the hearer is to get off the speaker's toe when the hearer has understood the speaker's intention to use that utterance to produce that effect.
Austin (1962) has claimed that speakers do not simply produce sentences that are true or false, but rather perform speech actions such as requests, assertions, suggestions, warnings, etc. Searle (1969) has adapted Grice's (1957) recognition of intention analysis to his effort to spec@ the necessary and sufficient conditions on the successful performance of speech acts. Though Searle's landmark work has led to a resurgence of interest in ?he study of the pragmatics of language, the intentional basis of communicative acts requires further elaboration and formalization; one must state €or any communicative act, precisely which intentions are involved and on what basis a speaker expects and intends those intentions to be recognized.
The Sphinx demands a competence theory of speech act communication-a theory that formally models the possible intentions underlying speech acts. This paper presents the beghings of such a theory by treating intentions as plans and by showing how plans can link speech acts with nonlinguistic behavior. In addition, an adequacy test for plan-based speech act theories is proposed and applied.
A Plan-based Theory of Speech Acts
Problem solving involves pursuing a goal state by performing a sequence of actions from an initial state. A human problem-solver can be regarded as "executing" aplan that prespecifies the sequence of actions to be taken. People can construct, execute, simulate, and debug plans, and in addition, can sometimes infer the plans of other agents from their behavior. Such plans often involve the communication of beliefs, desires and emotional states for the purpose of influencing the mental states and actions of others. Furthermore, when trying to communicate, people expect and want others to recognize their plans and may attempt to facilitate that recognition.
Formal descriptions of plans typically treat actions as operators, which are defined in terms of applicability conditions, calledpreconditions, efeects that will be obtained when the corresponding actions are executed, and bodies that describe the means by which the effects are achieved. Since operators are repre-'See also (Strawson, 1964 , Schiffer, 1972 sentations, their preconditions, effects, and bodies are evaluated relative to the problem-solver's model of the world. We hypothesize that people maintain, as part of their models of the world, symbolic descriptions of the world models of other people. Our plan-based approach will regard speech acts as operators whose effects are primarily on the models that speakers and hearers maintain of each other.* Any account of speech acts should answer questions such as:
-Under what circumstances can an observer believe that a speaker has sincerely and successfuIiy performed a particular speech act in producing an utterance for a hearer? (The observer could also be the hearer or speaker.)
-What changes does the successful performance of a speech act make to the speaker's model of the hearer, and to the hearer's model of the speaker?
-How is the meaning (sensdreference) of an utterance x related to the acts that can be performed in uttering x? To achieve these ends, a theory of speech acts based on plans should specify at least the following: -A planning system: a formal language for describing states of the world, a language for describing operators, a set of plan construction inferences, a specification of legal plan structures. Semantics for the formal languages should also be given.
-Definitions of speech acts as operators in the planning system. What are their effects? When are they applicable? How can they be realized in words?
As an illustration of this approach, this paper presents a simple planning system, defines the speech acts of requesting and informing as operators within that system, and develops plans containing direct requests, informs and questions (which are requests to inform). We do not, however, discuss how those speech acts can be realized in words.
We argue that a plan-based theory, unlike other proposed theories of speech acts, provides formal adequacy criteria for speech act definitions: given an initial set of beliefs and goals, the speech act operator definitions and plan construction inferences should lead to the generation of plans for those speech acts that a person could issue appropriately under the same circumstance^.^ This adequacy criterion should be used in judging whether speech act definitions pass certain tests, in particular, the test of compositionality. For instance, since a speaker can request that a hearer do some arbitrary action, the operator definitions should show how a speaker can request a hearer to perform a speech act. Similarly, since one can inform a hearer that an action was done, the definitions should capture a speaker's informing a hearer that a speech act was performed. We show how a number of previous formulations of requesting and informing are 2This approach was inspired by Bruce and Schmidt ( 1974) and Bruce (1975) . This paper can be viewed as supplying methodological foundations for the analyses of speech acts and their patterned use that they present.
'Though this could perhaps be an empirical criterion, it will be used intuitively here.
compositionally inadequate, and then develop definitions of informing that can Another goal of this research is to develop metatheoretical principles that state how to formulate speech act definitions to p a s these adequacy tests. This paper proposes such a principle and shows how its application Ieads to compositionally adequate definitions for multiparty requests (as in ' 'Ask Tom to open the door ' ') .
To simplifi our problems in the early stages of theory construction, several restrictions on the communication situation that we are trying to model have been -Any agent's model of another will be defined in terns of "facts" that the first believes the second believes, and goals that the first believes the second is attempting to achieve. We are not attempting to model obligations, feehgs, etc.
-The only speech acts we try to model are requests, informs, and questions since they appear to be definable solely in terms of beliefs and goals. Requesting and informing are prototypical members of Searle 's ( 1976) ' 'directive ' * and ' 'representative ' ' classes, respectively, and are interesting since they have a wide range of syntactic realizations, and account for a large proportion of everyday utterances.
-We have limited ourselves to stbdying ''instrumental dialogues "-conversations in which it is reasonable to assume that the utterances are planned and that the topic of discourse remains fixed. Typically, such dialogues arise in situations in which the conversants are cooperating to achieve some task-related goal (Deutsch, 1974) , for example, the purchasing of some item. The value of studying such conversations relative to the structure of a task is that the conversants' plans can be more easily formalized. composed into questions.
imposed:

A Competence Theory of Speech Acts
At least two interdependent aspects of a plan-based theory should be examined-the plans themselves, and the methods by which a person could construct or recognize those plans. This paper will be concerned with theories of the first aspect, which we shall term competence theories, analogous to competence theories of grammar (Chomsky , 1965). A plan-based competence theory of speech acts describes the set of possible plans underlying the use of particular kinds of speech acts, and thus states the conditions under which speech acts of those types are appropriate. Such descriptions are presented here in the form of a set of operator definitions (akin to grammatical "productions") and a specification of the ways in which plans are created from those operators.
The study of the second aspect aims for aprocess theory, which concerns how an ideal speakerhearer chooses one (or perhaps more than one) plan out of the set of possible plans. Such a theory would characterize how a speaker decides what speech act to perform and how a hearer identifies what speech act was performed by recognizing the plan(s) in which that utterance was to play a part.
By .separating out these two kinds of theoretical endeavors we are not claiming that one can study speech act competence totally divorced from issues of processing. On the contrary, we believe that for a (carefd) speaker to issue a particular speech act appropriately, she must d e t e d e that the hearer's speech act recognition process(es) will correctly classify her utterance. Thus, a competence theory would state the conditions under which a speaker can make that detennination--sonditions that involve the speaker's beliefs about the hearer's beliefs, gods , and inferential processes.
Our initial competence theory has been embodied in a computer program (Cohen, 1978) that can construct most of the plans presented here. Programs often point out weaknesses, inconsistencies, and incorrect assumptions in the statement of the competence theory, and can provide an operational base from which to propose process theories. However, we make no claims that computational models of plan construction and recognition are cognitive process theories; such claims would require empirical validation. Moreover, it is unclear whether there could be just one process theory of intentional behavior since each individual might use a different method. A more reasonable goal, then, is to construct computational models of speech act use for which one could argue that a person could employ such methods and converse successfully.
Outline of the Paper
The thread of the paper is the successive refinement of speech act definitions to meet the adequacy criteria. First, we introduce in sections 2 and 3 the tools needed to construct plans: the formal language for describing beliefs and gods, the form of operator definitions, and a set of plan construction inferences.
As background material, section 4 summarizes Austin's and Searle's accounts of speech acts. Then, Searle's definitions of the speech acts of requesting and informing are refonnulated as planning operators in section 5 and plans linking those speech acts to beliefs and goals are given. These initial operator definitions are shown to be compositionally inadequate and hence are recast in section 6 to allow for the planning of questions. Section 7 shows how the definitions are again inadequate for modelling plans for composed requests.
After both revising the preconditions of requests and identifying their side effects, compositional adequacy for multiparty requests is achieved. The solution leads to a metatheoretical ''point of view ' ' principle for use in formulating future speech act definitions within this planning system. Finally, section 8 discusses the limitations of the fonnalism and ways in which the approach might be extended to handle indirect speech acts.
ON MODELS OF OTHERS
In this section, we present criteria that illl account of one agent's (AGT1) model of another's (AGT2's) beliefs and goals ought to satisfy.4 A theory of speech acts need not be concerned with what is actually true in the real world; it should describe language use in terns of a person's beliefs about the world. Accordingly, AGTl's model of AGT2 should be based on "believe" as described, for example, in Hintikka ( 1962; 1969) . Various versions of the concept ''know ' ' can then be defined to be agreements between one person's beliefs and another's.
Belief
Apart from simply distinguishing AGTl 's beliefs from his beliefs about AGT2's beliefs, AGT 1 's belief representation ought to allow him to represent the fact that AGT2 knows whether some proposition P is true, without AGTl's having to know which of P or -P it is that AGT2 believes. A belief representation should also distinguish between situations like the following: between the readings of "AGT2 wants to take a train" as "There is a specific train that AGT2 wants to take" or as "AGT2 wants to take any train. " Finally, it
should allow arbitrary embeddings with BELIEVE. W a n t s of beliefs (as in ''AGT 1 WANTS AGT2 BELIEVE P ' ') become the reasons for AGT 1 's telling P to AGT2, while beliefs of wants (i.e., AGTl BELIEVES AGTl WANTS P) will be the way to represent AGTl 's goals P.' In modelling planning behavior, we are not concerned with goals that the agent does not think he has, nor are we concerned with the subtleties of "wish," "hope," "desire," and "intend" as these words are used in English. The fonnd semantics of WANT, however, are problematic. (Sacerdoti, 1975) . The changes that an operator makes to the world model in which it is evaluated to produce a new world male1 are called that operator's effects.
MODELS OF PLANS
We shall view plans for an arbitrary agent S to be constructed using (at least) the following heuristic principles of purposeful behavior:
At the time of S's planning:
1. S should not introduce in the plan actions whose effects S believes are (or w i l l be) true at the time the action is initiated. The process of planning to achieve a goal is essentially a search through this space of inferences to find a temporal sequence of operators such that the first operator in the sequence is applicable in the planner's current world model and the last produces a world model in which the goal is true. A new world model is obtained by the execution of each operator.
2.
The Form of Operators
Early approaches to problem-solving based on fmt order logic (Green, 1969; McCarthy & Hayes, 1969) To overcome this problem, Fikes and Nilsson (1971) in their STRIPS planning system assume that all aspects of the world stay constant except as described by the operator's effects and logical entailments of those effects. Such an assumption is not formalized in the reasoning system, making it difficult to prove the correctness of the resulting plans. Nevertheless, it has become the standard assumption upon which to build problem-solvers. We too will make it and thus shall describe an operator's effects by the propositions that are to be added to the model of the wor1d.lo
All operator schemata will have two kinds of preconditions-"cando** and "want" preconditions. The former, referred to as CANDO.PRs, indicate proposition schemata that, when instantiated with the parameter values of an operator instance, yield propositions that must be true in the world model for that operator instance to be applicable. We do not discuss how they can be proven true. The "want'* precondition, henceforth WANT.PR, formalizes a principle of intentional behavior-the agent of an action has to want to do that action.
The following example serves to illustrate the form of such definitions.
MOVE(AGT,SOURCE, DESTINATION) CANDO.PR: L W A G T , SOURCE)
WANT. PR:
EFFECT: L W A G T , DESTINATION) AGT BELIEVE AGT WANT more-instance
The parameters of an operator scheme are stated in the first line of the definitions and it is assumed that values of these parameters satisfy the appropriate selectional restrictions, (here, a person, and two locations, respectively). The WANT.PR uses a parameter "move-instance" that will be filled by any instance of the MOVE operator schema that is currently being planned, executed, or recognized. The CAND0.PR states that before an agent can move from the SOURCE location, he must be located there. The EFFECT of the MOVE indicates that the agent's new location is the DESTINATION.
S's plan to achieve goal G is pictured schematically in Figure 1 (P and Q are arbitrary agents, A1 and A2 are arbitrary actions). Instead of indicating the entire state of the planner's beliefs after each operator, those propositions that are effects of an operator and are preconditions of some other operator in the plan are presented.
%~
propositions that need to be deleted (or somehow made "invisible" in the current worimodcl) will not be discussed here. This diagram illustrates the building block of plans-given goal G, S applies an inference of type 2 and selects operator A1 , whose agent is Q -as a producer of that effect. That operator is applicable when preconditions Ci and Cj hold and when agent Q wants to perform A l . Type 3 inferences allow each of the preconditions to be achieved by other actions (e.g., A2), which may be performed by another agent (e.g., P). This chaining of operators continues until all preconditions are satisfied. Plan diagrams are thus read from "top" to "bottom".
To indicate that this schematic is part of agent S's plan, the plan compo-
The truth or falsity of preconditions is evaluated w i t h respect to S's beliefs. For example, verifying the WANT.PR of operator A1 (i,e., Q BELIEVE Q WANT Q do A l ) would involve establishing that S BELIEVE Q BELIEVE Q WANT Q do A1 . If Q is the same person as S (i.e., S is planning her own action A 1) then this condition is trivially true since A1 is already part of S's plan, and since for all agents R, we assume that if R BELIEVE (f) then R BELIEVE R BELIEVE (P). However, if Q is not the same as S , the WANT.PR also needs to be achieved, leading, as we shall see, to S's planning a speech act.
SPEECHACTS
Austin's Perfonnatives
Austin (1962) New distinctions, however, bring new problems. Frequently, when performative verbs are not used, the utterance's illocutionary force is not directly interpretable from its content. For example, to understand the force of the utterance "The door, " the hearer may need to use his beliefs that the door is currently closed, that the speaker has two arm-loads of groceries, and that he wants to be on the other side of the door in determining that the speaker has requested that the door be opened. Furthermore, a speaker may appear to be performing one illocutionary act, and actually may be trying to use it to do something else. Thus, "We have to get up early tomorrow" may simply be an assertion but when said at a party, may be intended as an excuse to the host for leaving, and may be intended as a request that the hearer leave. Such indirect speech acts (Gordon 8z Lakoff, 1971; Searle, 1974) are the touchstone of any theory of speech acts.
The last major kind of act identified by Austin is theperlocutionmy actthe act performed by making an utterance. For instance, with the illocutionary act of asserting something, I may convince my audience of the truth of the corresponding proposition (or insult or Righten them). Perlocutionary acts produce perlocutionary effects: convincing produces belief and frightening produces fear. While a speaker often has performed illocutionary acts with the god of achieving certain perlocutionary effects, the actual securing of those effects is Gyond his control. Thus, it is entirely possible for a speaker to make an assertion, and for the audience to recognize the force of the utterance as an assertion and yet not be convinced.
Speech Acts a la Searle
Searle (1969) presents a formulation of the structure of illocutionary acts (henceforth referred to simply as speech acts) by suggesting a number of necessary and sufficient conditions on their successful performance. He goes on to state rules corresponding to these conditions, for a speaker's using any "indicator of illocutionary force" to perform a particular speech act.
As an example, let us consider Searle's conditions for a speaker S, in. uttering T, to request that some hearer H do action A. The conditions are grouped as follows: Searle claims the non-obviousness condition is not peculiar to illocutionary acts. This paper will support his claim by showing how the condition can be applied more generally to rational, intentional behavior.
Sincerity Condition. A sincerity condition distinguishes a sincere performance of the speech act from an insincere one. In the case of a request, S must want H to do A; for a promise, S must intend to do the promised action; for an assertion, S must believe what he is asserting.
Essential
Condition. An essential condition specifies what S was trying to do. For a request, the act is an attempt to get H to do A.
Force Condition (our terminology). The purpose of theforce condition is to require that the speaker utter a speech act only if he intends to communicate that he is performing that act. ''Intending to communicate" involves having certain intentions regarding how the hearer w i l l recognize the force of the utterance. The basic idea is that it is intended that the hearer recognize that the speaker is trying to bring about the satisfaction of the essential condition. For a request this amounts to the speaker's wanting the hearer to realize the speaker intends for him to do A.
A FIRST REFORMULATION OF SEARLE'S CONDlTxONS
Searle (1969) unfortunately does not supply justifications for the adequacy of his definitions for various kinds of speech acts. A primary god of this paper is to show how a plan-based theory provides the basis for such adequacy criteria by allowing one to see clearly how changes in speech act definitions affect the plans that can be generated.
A second, more specific point of this formulation exercise is to show which of Searle's conditions are better regarded as pertaining to more general aspects of intentional behavior than to particular speech acts. In this spirit, we show how the sincerity condition, which we shall argue is a misnomer, and the p r o p sitional content and "non-obviousness" conditions arise during the course of planning. Concerning the remaining conditions, we assume the "nonnal input/ output conditions," but have chosen not to deal with the force condition until we have a better understanding of the plans for speech acts and how they can be recognized. The remaining conditions, the preparatory and essential conditions, will be mapped into the formalism as the preconditions and effects of speech act operators.
First Definition of REQUEST
Searie claims the preparatory conditions are required for the "happy" performance of the speech act-where "happy" is taken to be synonymous with Austin's use of "felicitous." Austin was careful to distinguish among infelicities, in particular, misapplications (performing the act in the wrong circumstances), and flaws (incorrectly performing the act). We take Searle's preparatory conditions as conditions guaranteeing applicability rather than successful performance, allowing them to be formalized as preconditions. Thus if an operator's preconditions are not satisfied when it is performed, then the operator was "misapplied. " Before expressing preconditions in a formalism, a systematic "point of view" must be adopted. Since the applicability conditions affect the planning of that speech act, the preconditions are stated as conditions on the speaker's beliefs and goals. Correspondingly, the effects describe changes to' the hearer's mental state? We establish apoint-of-view principle, that is intended to be a guideline for constructing speech act definitions in this planning systemnamely: preconditions begin with "speaker believe" and effects with "hearer believe. ' 
'
Let us consider Searle's preparatory conditions for a request: H is able to do ACT, and S believes H is able to do ACT. From our discussion of "belief, " it should be clear what H can in fact do, i.e., what the real world is like is not essential to the success of a request. What may be relevant is that S andor H thinks H can do ACT. To formalize "is able to do A," we propose a predicate CANDO (Q,ACT) that is true if the CANDO.PR's of ACT are true (with person Q bound to the agent role of ACT).12
The essential condition, which is modeled as the EFFECT of a REQUEST, llThis does not violate our modelling just one person's view since a speaker, after having issued a speech act, will update his beliefs to include the effects of that spcech act, which are defined in terms of the h m ' $ beliefs. is based on a separation Of the ihcutionary act from perlocutionary effect. Speakers, we claim, cannot influence their hearers' beliefs and gods directly.
The EFFECTS of REQUEST' are modeled so that the hearer's actually wanting to do ACT is not essential to the successful completion of the speech act. Thus, the EFFECT is stated as the hearer's believing the speaker wants hirn to do the act. For important reasons, to be discussed in section 5.7, this formulation of the essential condition will prove to be a major stumbling block. The plan for a REQUEST is now straightforward. REQUEST supplies the necessary precondition for CAUSE-TO-WANT (as will other act combinations).
When the WANT.PR of some action that the speaker is p l w g for someone else to perform, is not believed to be m e , the speaker plans a REQUEST. For example, assume a situation in which there are two agents, SYSTEM13(S) and JOHN, who are located inside a mom (i.e., they are at location INROOM).
Schematically, to get JOHN to leave the room by moving himself to location 13The agent who creates plans will often be r c f d to as "SYs"Eh&" which sbould be read as "'planning system. '* OUTROOM, the plan would be as in Figure 2 do the action being requested, independently of the request. If that were obvious to the speaker, the request would be pointless. However, as Searle noted, the don-obviousness condition applies more generally to rational, intentional behavior than to speech acts alone. In our formalism, it is fie WANT.PR of the act being requested (goal ''+ + " in Figure 2 ). If the planning system believed the WANT.PR were already true, Le., if it believed that John already wanted to leave the room, then the plan would proceed no further; no REQUEST would take place. Searle's "sincerity" condition, stated that the speaker had to want the requested act to be perfonned. The sincerity condition in the plan of Figure 2 is the goal labeled "+ . " The speaker's wanting the hearer to move is the reason for planning a REQUEST. Notice also that the propositional content of the REQUEST, a future act to be performed by the hearer, is determined by prior planning-i.e., by a cornbination of that act's WANT.PR, the mediating act CAUSE-TO-WANT, and by the EFFECT of a REQUEST. Searle's propositional content condition thus seems to be a function of the essential condition (which is approximated by the EFFECTS of the speech act operator), as Searle claimed. So far, we have factored out those aspects of a request that Searle suggested were eliminable. Future revisions w i l l depart more significantly.
Definition of INFORM
The speech act of informing is represented by the operator INFORM, which is defined as a speaker's stating a proposition to a hearer for the purpose of getting the hearer to believe that the speaker believes that proposition to be true. Such acts will usually be planned on the basis of wanting the hearer to believe that proposition. This operator says that for AGT 1 to convince AGT of the truth of PROP AGT need only believe that AGTl thinks PROP is true. Though this may be a necessary prerequisite to getting someone to believe something, it is clearly not sufficient. For a more sophisticated precondition of CONVINCE, one might state that before AGT will be convinced, she needs to know the justifications for AGT'I's belief, which may require that AGT believe (or be CONVINCE of) the justifications for believing those justifications, etc. Such a chain of reasons for believing might be terminated by mutual beliefs that people are expected to have or by a belief AGT believes AGTl already has. Ideally, a good model of CON-VINCE would allow one to plan persuasive arguments.15
Planning INFORM Speech Acts
The planning of INFORM speech acts now becomes a simple matter. For any proposition PROP, S's plan to achieve the goal H BELIEVE PROP would be that of Figure 3 . Notice that it is unnecessary to state as a precondition to infonn, that the hearer H does not already believe PROP. Again, this non-obviousness condition that can be eliminated by viewing speech acts in a planning context. What would.be Searle's sincerity condition for the INFORM above (S BELIEVE PROP) turns out to be a precondition for the speech act rather than a reason for planning the act as we had for REQUEST'S sincerity condition, (i.e., and SPEAKER BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT HEARER BELIEVE PROP, are subject to insincerity.
SPEAKER BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT HEARER do ACT
Planning an INFORM of a WANT
As stated earlier, there are other ways to satisfy the precondition to CAUSE-TO-WANT. Since REQUEST was taken as a prototypical directive act, all members of that class share the same EFFECT (Searle's (1 976) ''illwutionary point"). However, issuing an INFORM of a WANT, as in "I want you to do X," also achieves it. Another plan to get John to move appears in The initial stages of this plan are identical to that of Figure 2 (Allen, 1979 ; Perrault & Allen, forthcoming) lies in formulating speech act bodies as plans acbieving the perlocutionary effect-plans that a hearer is intended to recognize. In the next two sections, we investigate the compositional adequacy of these operator definitions via the planning of REQUESTS that a hearer perform REQUEST or WFOORM speech acts.
COMPOSITIONAL ADEQUACY: QUESTIONS
We are in agreement with many others, in proposing that questions be treated as requests for information. In terns of speech act operators, the questioner is performing a REQUEST that the hearer perform an WORM. That is, the REQUEST leads to the satisfaction of INFORM'S "want precondition.'' However, for a wh-question, the INFORM operator as defined earlier cannot be used since the questioner does not know the full propsition of which he is to be informed. If he did know what the proposition was there would be no need to ask; he need only decide to' believe it.
Intuitively, one plans a whquestion to find out the value of some expression and a yesho question to find out whether some proposition is true. Such questions are planned, respectively, on the basis of believing t h t the hearer knows what the value of that expression is or that the hearer knows whether the proposition is true, without the speaker's having to know what the hearer believes.
Earlier we stated that a person's (AGTI) belief representation should represent cases like the following distinctly: However, Case 3 can be approximated by a quantified belief, namely, 3x AGT2 BELIEVE ( t k y : DEPARtURE-TIME(CA"ONBALL-EXPRESS,~)) 5 x),
where "the y : P(y), " often written "iy P(y)," is the logical description operator read "the y which is P. " This formula is best paraphrased as "there is something 
CANDO.PR:
EFFECT:
3y AGT BEUEM AGTl BEUEVE (ixDx) = y 3y AGT BEUEVE (ixDx) = y Using these operators, if the planning system wants to know where Mary is and believes that Joe knows where she is, it can create the plan underlying the question "Where is Mary?" as is shown in Figure 5 . After the system plans for Joe to tell it Mary's location, on the basis of believing that he knows where she is, it must get Joe to w&t to perfom this act. In the usual fashion, this leads to a REQUEST and hence the construction of a question. The precondition to 
Plans for Yes/No Questions
To plan a yedno question about some proposition P, one should think that the hearer knows whether P is true or false (or, at least "might know"). An approximate representation of AGT2's knowing whether P is true or false is OR (AGT2 BELIEVE P, AGT2 BELIEVE -P)). 
The plan for a yedno question to Joe is now parallel to that of a whquestion.20 That is, in the course of planning some other act, if the system Wants proposition P to be true or to be false, and if the buth-value of propsition P is unknown to it, it can create the goal OR(SYSTEM BELIEVE P, SYSTEM BELIEVE -P). For instance if P were LOC(MARY,~ROOM), the illocutionary acts underlying the question to Joe "Is Mary in the room?" can be planned provided the planning system believes that Joe either believes P is true or he believes P is false. That disjunctive belief could be stated directly or could be inferred from a belief like 3 y JOE BELIEVE(ixLOC(UARY,x)) = y-i.e., there is something Joe believes is Mary's Iocation. But if it had some idea where Joe thought Mary was, say OUTROOM, then it would not need to ask. question.** The reason for these new acts is that, in planning a REQUEST that someoae else perform an INFORM act, one only has incomplete knowledge of their beliefs and goals; but an INFORM, as originally defined can only be planned when one knows what is to be said.
6.3
COMPOSITIONAL ADEQUACY AND THE POINT OF VIEW PRINCIPLE
Earlier, a guiding "Point of View Principle" (POW) for defining speech acts as planning operators was proposed: the preconditions of the operator should be stated from the speaker's point of view, i.e., in terms of the speaker beliefs; the effects should be stated from the hearer's point of view. We now wish to judge the adequacy of speech act definitions formulated along these lines. The test case 21The language for stating opxators needs to be extended to accwlt for "which," "how," and "why" questions. For instance, "why" and "how" questions hvohe quantifying over actions andor plans.
will be the composing of REQUESTS, i.e., the planning of a REQUEST that some third party himself perform a REQUEST. For instance, the utterance "Ask Tom to tell you where the key is" is an example of such a third party request.
The current definitions of speech acts will be shown to be compositionally inadequate since they force speakers to have unnecessary knowledge about intennediaries ' beliefs. Achieving compositional adequacy, however, requires more than a simple restatement of the point of view principle; the side effects of speech act operators also must be considered.
Our scrutiny w i l l be focused upon the seemingly innocent precondition to REQUEST, SPEAKER BELIEVER HEARER CANDO ACT whose fonn depended on the POW. The goal is to show how the POW leads us astray and how a formulation of that precondition according to a new POW that suggests a more neutral point of view for speech act definitions sets us back on course. From here on, the two versions of the precondition will be referred to as the "speakerbased ' ' and ' 'neutral ' ' versions.
Plans for Multiparty Speech Acts
Multiparty speech acts can arise in conversations where communication is somehow restricted so as to pass through intemediaries.= The planning system, since it is recursive, can generate plans for such speech acts using any number of intermediaries provided that appropriate decisions are made as to who will perform what action.
Let us suppose that the planning system wants to know where a particular key is and that it must communicate through John. We shall use the speakerbased precondition on REQUEST for this example, and for readibility, the following abbreviations: Figure 6 shows the plan for the specific three-party speech act underlying "Ask Tom to tell me where the key is. " S develops the plan in the following fashion: T is chosen to tell S the key's location since, we shall assume, he is believed to know where it is. Since T is not believed to already want to tell, and since S cannot communicate directly with T (but T can communicate with S), J is chosen to be the one to talk T into telling.
Since J is not believed to already want to do that, S plans a REQUEST that J perform a REQUEST, namely REQUEST(S,J,REQUEST (J,TWORMREF (T,S,XyLOC (KEY23,y)))). J, then, is an intermediary who is just expected to do what he is asked; his status will be discussed soon. While the plan appears to be straightforward, precondition P3 is clearly unnecessary4 ought to be able to plan this partid= act without having any prior knowledge of the intexmediary's beliefs-This Prior howledge requirement comes about because precondition P5 is constructed bY composing REQUEST'S precondition schema with precondition P3, and P3 is similarly constructed from PI.
The problem can be eliminated by reformulating REQUEST'S precondition as HEARER CANDO ACT. Consider a general plan for three-party REQUESTS, as in Figure 7 . T's INFORMREF has been generalized to "ACT(T)" whose precondition is "P. "
S BELIEVE S WANT:
Figure 7. A third party REQUEST using the "neutral" precondition.
The preconditions that have to be satisfied in S's plan are:
(Pl) P (also P3 and P5) (P2) T BELIEVE (P) (P4) J BEUEVE (P) depends upon his beliefs about the speaker's beliefs and goals, the side effects of a speech act cannot be specified in advance. However, the hearer is &ally entitled to believe the speaker thought her speech act's preconditions held (Bruce, 1975; Bruce 8~ Schmidt, 1974 ).= Furthermore, not only do hearers make such assumptions about speakers' beliefs, but speakers h o w that and often depend on those assumptions for the success of their plans. Figure 8 is a schematic of a simple plan by S to REQUEST H to do action ACT that illustrates this situation.
The minimal side effect is that the hearer believes the speaker believes the precondition of the REQUEST holds, i.e., that HEARER BELIEVE SPEAKER BELIEVE HEARER CANDO ACT'. This goal satisfies, via a CONVINCE, the CANDO.PR of CAUSE-TO-WANT, and hence the REQUEST achieves two gbals in the plan." The schematic can be applied twice in Figure 7 to obtain Figure 9 .
After the side effects of J's REQUEST to T take hold, T would think J believes the preconditions to J's REQUEST (P) obtain. We claim that it is because T thinks that J believes P that T comes to believe P. In this way, precondition (P2) is satisfied as a result of J's REQUEST. Naturally, the side effect argument applies equally to J as the hearer of S's REQUEST. That is, J comes to believe P (precondition (P4)) because he thinks S believes P. S's belief that the preconditions to action A hold thus gets "passed" down the line of intennediaries, whatever its length, to the find agent of A. In this way S can issue the third party REQUEST without having any prior knowledge of J's beliefs about P; S's REQUEST provides all the necessary information?
An interesting aspect of this transmission is that, while J may come to believe P and, by making a REQUEST to T, transmit this belief, T's belief that P may be of little use to T. Consider Figure 9 again. Suppose P were 3y T BEUEVE (ixLOC(KM23,x))= y which we are loosely paraphrasing as T knows where.the key is. S's REQUEST conveys S's belief that T knows where the key is. Though J, to decide to perfom his REQUEST, need only think that T knows where the key is, T actually has to know where it is before he can do A? J's conveying his belief does no good =The hearer may in fact believe those preconditions arc false. T h e simple backward-chaining planning algorithm described in Cohen (1978) could not easily construct this plan since it ignores intermediate states of the world model that would be created after each operator's execution (ix., after S's, and J's. REQUESTS).
=T cannot obtain that information from believing P since By T BELIEVE ixLOC(KEY23,x) = y cannot be i n f e d from T B n V E 8 y T BFLEVE ixLOC(KEY23,x) = y, by B.2 and B.7 (footnote 5). If CONVINCE can be defined so that AGTl cannot bc convinced by AGT2 that AGTl believes something, then J could not CONVINCE T that 3y T BELIEVE ixLoc(KEY23,x) = y on the basis of T's &inking that J believes it. since he has supplied information for a CONVINCE; but T needs information sufficient for a CONVINCEWH. A planning system has to be able to realize this and to plan, by making the same choices as before, the additional REQUEST that John perform an INFORM, e.g., 'Tell Tom that the key is in the closet.'%
A New Point-of-View Principle
In addition to considering side effects for speech acts, we are led to propose a new point-of-view principle:
The "Cando" preconditions and effects of specch acts should be deked i n a way that does not depend on who the speakcr of that speech act is. That is, no CANDO.OR or EFFECT should be stated as a proposition bcghbg with "SPEAKER BELTEVE. * * a6The side effects again figure in this additional three--REQUEST--John comes to belkve that the key is in the cluset by believing hiit S thinks so. me CANDO.PRs of speech acts defined according to this principle not only resolve our difficulties with composite speech acts, but they also behave as desired for the usual noncomposite cases since preconditions now depend only on he planner's beliefs, and the planner is often the speaker. Thus speech act definitions are intimately bound to the form of the planning system. The only result the new principle has on the form of the EFFECTS of speech acts is to make clear whose beliefs should be updated with those EF-FECTS. After successfully executing a speech act to H, the speaker can update his model of H with the speech act's EFFECTS. But, for a composite speech act ulrimately directed to H, the initial planner must observe or assume the success of the rest of the multiparty plan in order to conciude that the EFFECTS of the k d speech act to H hold.
While the new principle guarantees that the EFFECTS of speech acts are independent of the use of intermediaries, hearers have every right to believe that the speakers of those speech acts believe that the preconditions hold. Because side effects are stated in terms of the hearer's beliefs about the speaker's beliefs, intermediaries are vulnerable to a charge of insincerity if they brazenly execute the speech acts they were requested to perform. It is to avoid such a charge, and thus make intermediaries "responsible for" the speech acts they execute, that we place the condition on CAUSE-TO-WANT stating that AGT BELIEVE AGT CANDO ACT.
Finally, to complete the reexamination of speech act definitions we point out that the WANT.PR also has a SPEAKER BELIEVE on it. One cannot, in the spirit of "housecleaning, " remove the SPEAKER BELIEVE SPEAKER WANT from the WANT.PR of speech acts since a speaker's goal cannot be characterized independently of the speaker's beliefs, unless one is willing to model someone 's "unconscious ' ' goals. We are not? 
New using this
Definitions of REQUEST and INFORM
summary
The appropriate planning of composite speech acts has tumed out to be a power- principle. Since these last two speech acts were taken to be prototypes of Searle's (1976) "directive" and "representative" classes, the principle will find wide application. A side effect of direct requests was identified and used in planning multiparty speech acts. Side effects, however, cannot be calculated until the hearer has recognized the speaker's plan and thus has classified the observed utterance as a particular speech act type. Thus the minimal side effect formulation given here should be further justified on the basis of what a hearer needs to assume about the speaker's beliefs in order to identifv an utterances's illocutionary force.
There may be other ways to meet compositional adequacy. For instance, one could state explicitly that an action's preconditions should be true at the time the action is to be done (Bruce, 1975) . For our multiparty REQUESTS, such an approach (using a 'speaker-based precondition) produces preconditions like: S believes J will believe P will be true when ACT is to be done, which seems reasonable. However, the minimal side effect of S's REQUEST then becomes: 3 now believes that (before that REQUEST) S expected J to believe that P would be true when ACT is done (where "now " is just after the REQUEST was made). As yet, we do not have an analogue of CONVINCE that would allow J to then come to believe that P would be m e . Again, if REQUEST is defined using the neutral precondition, this problem does not arise.
CONCLUDINGREMAIRKS
It has been argued that a theory of speech acts can be obtained by modelling them in a planning system as operators defined, at least, in terms of the speakers' and hearers' beliefs, and goals. Thus, speech acts are treated in the same way as physical acts, allowing both to be integrated into plans. Such an approach suggests new areas for application. It may provide a more systematic basis for studying real dialogues arising in the course of a task-a basis that would facilitate the tracking of conversants' beliefs and intentions as dialogue and task proceed. A similar analysis of characters' plans has also been shown (Bruce & Newman, 1978) to be essential to a satisfactory description of narrative. Finally, Allen (1979) and Cohen (1978) have suggested how computer conversants might plan their speech acts and recognize those of their users.
Given this range of application, the methodological issues of how speech acts should be modelled in a planning system become important. Specifically, a plan-based competence theory, given configurations of beliefs and goals, speech act operators, and plan construction inferences should generate plans for all and only those speech acts that are appropriate in those configurations. This paper developed tests that showed how various definitions of the speech acts of requesting and infodng were inadequate, especially to the demand that they generate appropriate plans when composed with other speech acts to form questions and multiparty requests.
To resolve the difficulties, two "views" of INFORM to be used in constructing questions were defined, allowing the questioner to have incomplete knowledge of the hearer's beliefs. After revising both the form of speech act preconditions and identifying some speech act side effects, compositional adequacy for multiparty REQUESTS was achieved. The solution led to a metatheoretical "@nt-of-view " principle for use in defining future speech acts as operators within this planning system. Our approach has both assumed certain idealized properties of speaker/ hearers, and has been restricted in its scope. The preconditions and effects of our operators are stated in the language of logic, not because of any desire to perform logically valid inferences, but because the conditions in the plans should have well-defined semantics. While this has been partially realized through the adop tion of the possible-worlds sematics for belief, the semantics is too strong to be a faithful modef of human beliefs. For instance, it leads here to requiring a questioner to have very strong, though incomplete, knowledge of the hearer's beliefs. To reflect human beliefs more accurately, one needs to model (at least): degrees of belief, justifications, the failure to make deductions, inductive leaps, and knowing what/who/where something is. These refinements, though needed by a theory of speech acts, are outside its scope. Finally, the semantics for WANT and for actions are lacking (but see Moore (1979) for an interesting approachto the latter).
Only two kinds of speech acts, prototypes of Searle 's ( 1976) directive and representative classes, have been examined here, but the approach can be extended to other members of those classes (Bruce, 1975) and perhaps to the c o d s s i v e class that includes promises. However, in order to model promises and warnings, a better understanding of the concepts of benefit and obligation is necessary.
Finally, we have so far discussed how a planning system can select illocutionary force and propositional content of a speech act, but not how utterances realizing it can be constructed nor how illocutionary acts can be identified from utterances. Extending the plan-based approach to the first area means investigating the extent of "pragmatic influence" of linguistic processing. An important supbroblem here is the planning of referring expressions involved in performing illocutionary acts (Perrault & Cohen, forthcoming; Searle, 1969) . Regarding speech act identification, the acid-test of a plan-based approach is its treatment of indirect speech acts (Searle, 1975) . Gordon and Lakoff (1971) proposed "conversational postulates" to account for the relation between the direct or literal and the indirect illocutionary forces of an utterance. But, as Morgan (1977) notes, by calling them "postulates," one implies they cannot be explained by some other independently motivated analysis.
We suggest that the relation between direct and indirect readings can be largely accounted for by considering the relationship between actions, their preconditions, effects, and bodies, and by modelling how language users can recognize plans, which may include speech acts, being executed by others. The ability to recognize plans is seemingly required in order to be help@, independent of the use of indirect speech acts. For instance, hearers often understand a speaker's utterance literally but go beyond it, inferring the speaker's plans and then performing acts that would enable the speaker's higher level goals to be fulfilled. Indirect speech acts arise because speakers can intend hearers to perform helpful inferential processing and they intend for hearers to know this. Allen (1979) and Perrault and Allen (forthcoming) formalize this process of intended planrecognition (and thus Searle's force condition) extending our plan-based a p proach to the interpretation of indirect speech acts.
